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The 2013–2016 Ebola virus outbreak centred in West Africa is the largest ever recorded and
has resulted in a substantial global response across Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. The out-
break, which exceeds 28,500 cases [1], has seen sporadic cases exported to the United King-
dom, the United States, Spain, Switzerland, and Italy, either in the form of repatriation of
confirmed cases or by case identification after travellers fell ill after returning from West
Africa. Secondary transmission has been recorded in the US[2] and Spain.[3] The transmission
of viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) differs between aetiological agents. Ebola virus transmis-
sion between individuals occurs via direct contact with blood and body fluids[4]; nosocomial
transmission is a prominent feature of outbreaks[5] but is not fully understood.[6]
There has, understandably, been a rise in suspected cases of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in
travellers returning to the UK from affected areas. It is important to consider the probability
of EVD or another VHF in a returning traveller alongside alternate differential diagnoses.
The importation of VHFs into the UK is extremely rare and other infectious diseases, such as
malaria or typhoid, are seen much more frequently. Clinicians will perform a risk assessment
for such patients, focussing on the precise location of travel and exposure risks whilst there. All
such patients require appropriate assessment and investigations whilst a diagnosis is made,
and supportive pathology assays play a key part in this management. These investigations
would be performed in pathology laboratories operating at Containment Level 2 (CL2), ac-
cording to the UK Health and Safety Executive[7]. Such laboratories operate using good labo-
ratory practice, which includes appropriate staff training, risk assessment, restricted access,
and appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), such as laboratory coats, gloves, and
eye protection where applicable. In comparison, Containment Level 4 laboratories are complex
facilities consisting of highly secure suites with restricted access, carefully controlled air-han-
dling systems with filtered air, and the meticulous control and inactivation of hazardous waste.
Manipulations of Hazard Group 4 pathogens[8] have traditionally been performed at this level
of containment.
There have been 18 confirmed cases of VHF imported to the UK since 1971 (Public Health
England data). Many of these cases presented to routine healthcare settings prior to the diag-
nosis being made. In most instances, pathology samples were obtained and processed in a
routine manner within CL2 laboratories. Evidence from outbreaks strongly indicates that
the main routes of transmission of VHF infection are direct contact (through broken skin
or mucous membrane) with blood or body fluids, indirect contact with environments
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contaminated with splashes or droplets of blood or body fluids, and inoculation with sharps.
Experts from the UK Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) agree that there
is no circumstantial or epidemiological evidence of an aerosol transmission risk from VHF
patients.
A review of previous cases of VHFs imported into the UK shows that biochemistry, haema-
tology, microbiology, and virology assays were performed using routine analysers in standard
CL2 pathology laboratories. Often, these assays were performed prior to the diagnosis being
made, yet no transmissions to laboratory workers were recorded (Table 1).[9][10][11][12] In
addition, over 9,000 cases of Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (CCHF) were reported in
Turkey between 2002 and 2014, with an estimated minimum 180,000 blood samples processed
in routine laboratories with no additional precautions. A review was performed of 51 health-
care exposures that occurred in 9 centres where 4,869 of these patients were managed. Of
these, only 2 cases in laboratory staff were identified. One may have been associated with a
needle-stick injury and the other with handling samples while not wearing appropriate PPE
(gloves).[13] There is no evidence of any risk of transmission when good laboratory practice is
followed within a CL2 laboratory. Although it is reassuring that large numbers of samples
from patients with CCHF infection have been processed safely in routine laboratories in Tur-
key, it should be noted that this bunyavirus is rarely transmitted person to person, so the paral-
lels between this and other VHF viruses need to be carefully considered. The potential routes
of transmission within a CL2 laboratory setting are, however, the same for all VHF agents.
Laboratory-acquired cases of EVD were reported in the West African outbreak; however, it
should be remembered that initial laboratory work in this outbreak was performed with
extremely limited facilities and resources. We are not aware of any imported cases of EVD to
resource-rich settings that have resulted in laboratory transmission, even when samples were
analysed with no additional precautions prior to diagnosis.
In vitro diagnostic systems (IVDS) include analysers that automate the diagnostic process
in clinical laboratories. These in vitro diagnostic medical devices (IVDMD) therefore process
blood or blood in suspension of testing fluids. Consequently, all IVDMD which perform as-
sessments on patients’ blood will regularly be challenged by exposure to blood-borne viruses
(BBV) which circulate within the population. Therefore, they should be designed to eliminate
or reduce as far as reasonably practicable the risk of infection to users and other persons,
which includes the staff who service the devices. Fundamental to this is the manufacturer’s
design to minimise the leakage of fluid and contamination, which may lead to microbial expo-
sure during normal use or servicing. [14]
Table 1. Details of staff exposure to confirmed cases of VHF imported into the United Kingdom.
Citation Virus and
Year
Location Comments
Crowcroft NS et al. Journal of Infection
(2004) 48, 221–228
Lassa
2000
UK Patient initially admitted to Hospital for Tropical Diseases (HTD), University College
London Hospitals (UCLH). 88 staff at the Royal Free Hospital (RFH) and UCLH followed
up. No seroconversions.
Kitching A et al. Eurosurveillance 14
(6), 12 February 2009
Lassa
2009
UK Patient initially admitted to Homerton University Hospital. Many samples taken and
processed for in-house and referred tests over 2 weeks. Transferred to HTD (UCLH) for
further laboratory tests. Transferred to High Level Isolation Unit (HLIU) at RFH where
patient passed away. 72 lab staff considered low risk (handled samples with personal
protective equipment [PPE]). No secondary cases reported.
Atkin S et al. Eurosurveillance 14(10),
12 March 2009
Lassa
2009
UK Admitted to HTD (UCLH). Passed away the same day. Laboratory staff: 21 “no risk”, 45
“low risk”, 3 “high risk”. No secondary cases reported.
Barr DA et al. Lancet. 2013 Oct 26 CCHF
2012
UK Admitted via Glasgow Accident and Emergency department (A&E). Routine blood
samples taken over 36 hours before diagnosis of CCHF confirmed and transferred to
HLIU at RFH. No secondary cases reported.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0005358.t001
PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0005358 May 18, 2017 2 / 6
Important viruses which are present in blood (viraemia) during chronic infections include
BBVs such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), hepatitis B virus (HBV), and hepatitis C
virus (HCV). Most viruses have the potential to cause a viraemia during an acute infection.
High hazard pathogens which are present in blood during acute infections include Ebola,
CCHF, Lassa fever, Marburg, dengue, chikungunya, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coro-
navirus (MERS-CoV), and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV).
Viruses are either naked or enveloped in structure (Fig 1). The envelope (where present) is
derived from the surrogate host cell, which, along with the associated viral receptors, is essen-
tial for attachment and host cell entry. Removal of the viral envelope inactivates the virus, pre-
venting replication and subsequent host infection (Fig 2). All of the high hazard viral diseases
cited are caused by enveloped viruses.
IVDS should be decontaminated prior to inspection, maintenance, repair, or disposal,
either on site or at the manufacturer’s or agent’s premises.[15] Decontamination must be car-
ried out in line with the manufacturer’s instructions using methods validated to inactivate
enveloped viruses. The enveloped viruses are among the most susceptible pathogens to disin-
fectants. [16] This is due to the presence of the lipid envelope, which is compromised by most
biocides. Compounds with validated efficacy against enveloped viruses include alcohols, alde-
hydes, biguanides (e.g., chlorhexidine), halogens, peroxygen compounds (e.g., hydrogen per-
oxide), peracetic acid, some phenols, and some quaternary ammonium compounds.
Manufacturers must validate their decontamination method against appropriate surrogate
model enveloped viruses. Laboratory viruses vary between strains and wild-type viruses.
Studies, by necessity, use laboratory strains which may be grown to high titre and efficiently
assayed. Any virus used in a validation study is, therefore, a model virus. Viral inactivation val-
idation studies have successfully used surrogate model viruses with properties similar to wild-
type viruses to provide evidence for the safety of human blood plasma products for over a
Fig 1. Schematic of an enveloped and non-enveloped virus.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0005358.g001
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decade.[17] Studies using model viruses are also used for pharmaceuticals, derived from
human and/or animal sources, including recombinant proteins produced in eukaryotic cell
lines, vaccines, and some Class III medical devices.[18]
Viral inactivation validation studies must inactivate a range of enveloped viruses, using at
least 3 viruses to represent different properties that IVDMDs are expected to be challenged
against. A suitable model virus for HIV, HBV, and HCV must be included. If an enveloped
virus has been shown to have a higher resistance to the manufacturer’s disinfectant class, then
a model for that virus should also be included. Once dried on inanimate surfaces, viruses are
less susceptible to decontamination than when hydrated in suspension.[19][20] Validation
studies should therefore include a quantitative suspension test for the assessment of internal
decontamination procedures [15] and quantitative carrier tests [21] or appropriate alternative
methods. An effective and reliable decontamination method will show a reduction of 4 log10.
[22] Despite some pathogens causing a very high titre viraemia, the design of IVDMDs reduces
their contamination as far as reasonably practicable. The design of IVDMDs means they only
require a small volume of blood to perform an analysis. Consequently, when an effective and
reliable decontamination method is in place that provides a reduction of 4 log10, this will inac-
tivate any residual enveloped virus within the IVDMD. Decontamination therefore renders
the IVDMD safe to use and service after challenge with any enveloped virus. Once assessed by
Fig 2. Schematic of viral attachment.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0005358.g002
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appropriately designed viral inactivation validation studies on relevant surrogate model envel-
oped viruses, the decontamination process has been shown to be effective against all known
and future emerging enveloped viruses, which includes Ebola, CCHF, Lassa fever, and Mar-
burg virus.
Guidance issued by the ACDP therefore states that samples taken from these patients may
be safely processed using standard precautions, good laboratory practice, and PPE, as the risk
of infection from these samples is low. [23] It also states that routine decontamination proce-
dures are adequate in these situations. The guidance further explains that autoanalysers are the
preferred method for processing such specimens. Sealed buckets should be used for any centri-
fugation procedures that are not undertaken within an autoanalyser. In certain circumstances,
the use of discrete analysers may need to be considered, but these are not a safer option. Point
of care (POC) blood gas analysers present a high risk of splashing and should only be used in
exceptional circumstances with suitable barrier protection PPE for staff and in a controlled
environment. When preparing blood film slides for malaria testing, consideration should be
given to the potential for splash and therefore should be carried out in a microbiological safety
cabinet or, alternatively, facial protection should be used. Likewise, blood cultures and blood
cross-matching may be performed at CL2 following appropriate risk assessment.
We also know from Health & Safety Executive Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Danger-
ous Occurrence Regulations (RIDDOR) data that rates of infection with BBVs in healthcare
workers are low, and the majority of these are needle-stick associated and not in laboratory
staff. [24] This is also supported by data from the UK significant occupational exposures sur-
veillance system. [24] Tens of thousands of samples are processed daily in routine pathology
laboratories that are, often unknown to us, positive for BBVs.
The important consideration here is about the clinical well-being and appropriate investiga-
tion and management of the patient. A delay in diagnosis of other traveller-associated infec-
tions, such as malaria or typhoid, as well as lack of access to supportive pathology assays, can
be fatal. Laboratory staff welfare is equally important, and the application of good laboratory
practice in a risk-assessment–led setting indicates that such samples may be analysed safely in
routine CL2 laboratories.
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